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In evaluating a pair of competing hypotheses, any ev-
idence that is equally likely to be observed under either
hypothesis is said to be nondiagnostic. Normatively, the
probability assigned to one of the hypotheses should be
determined exclusively on the basis of diagnostic evidence
and should be uninfluenced by nondiagnostic evidence.
In other words, the judged probability of the hypothesis
based on the full body of diagnostic and nondiagnostic
evidence should not differ from that based on the diag-
nostic evidence alone (assuming conditional indepen-
dence of the two subsets of evidence). Descriptively,
however, a number of studies have demonstrated that
people’s probability judgments are systematically influ-
enced by nondiagnostic evidence (Nisbett, Zukier, &
Lemley, 1981; Shanteau, 1975; Troutman & Shanteau,
1977; Zukier, 1982; Zukier & Jennings, 1983).
Specifically, probability judgments based on a combi-
nation of diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence tend to
be less extreme than judgments based on the diagnostic
evidence alone, a phenomenon that Nisbett et al. (1981)
called the dilution effect. In one of their studies, gradu-
ate students in social work were presented with client de-
scriptions and given the task of rating the likelihood that
the client was a child abuser. Each of the client descrip-
tions included one or more pieces of diagnostic informa-
tion (e.g., the client was sexually assaulted by his stepfa-
ther), crossed with none, two, four, or eight pieces of
nondiagnostic information (e.g., he manages a hardware
store; has an IQ of 110). The resulting descriptions were
evaluated in a random order with interspersed filler items.
When evaluated on its own in a pretest study, each piece
of nondiagnostic information was indeed rated as non-
diagnostic. Despite this, however, participants rated the
client as less likely to be a child abuser when the descrip-
tion included a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic in-
formation than when the description included only diag-
nostic information.
What Nisbett et al. (1981) called the dilution effect
had been observed previously by Troutman and Shanteau
(1977; see also Shanteau, 1975) in a standard “beads and
jars” belief-revision task. Participants were shown two
jars filled with differently colored beads in known pro-
portions and were provided with a sample of beads drawn
at random from one of the two jars. Their task was to
judge the probability that the beads had been drawn from
a designated jar on the basis of an initial sample of beads
and then to revise their judgment as further bead samples
were drawn from the same jar. Following an initial, diag-
nostic, sample of beads, the judged probability assigned
to the implicated jar was well above 50%, but then was
adjusted to be less extreme following an additional, non-
diagnostic, sample. When evaluated in isolation, though,
the nondiagnostic bead sample was indeed viewed as
nondiagnostic, in the sense that probability judgments
for the target jar were very close to 50%. In both the Nis-
bett et al. and Troutman and Shanteau studies, then, evi-
dence rated as nondiagnostic on its own nonetheless pro-
duced a dilution effect when combined with diagnostic
evidence, in comparison with judgments based on the di-
agnostic portion of the evidence alone.
The dilution effect is a widely cited and influential re-
sult. Collectively, the Nisbett et al. (1981) and Troutman
and Shanteau (1977) articles have been cited over 150
times since their publication. The consequences of the
dilution effect have been examined in areas as diverse as
the law (Smith, Stasson, & Hawkes, 1999), accounting
(Hackenbrack, 1992; Shelton, 1999), and consumer be-
havior (Meyvis & Janiszewski, 2002). In this paper, we
investigate the influence of different types of nondiag-
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Previous research has shown that probability judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiag-
nostic information are less extreme than judgments based on the diagnostic information alone. Results
of the present experiments suggest that this dilution effect holds only under a limited set of conditions.
When judgments based on a mix of diagnostic and nondiagnostic information are compared with sep-
arately elicited judgments based on the diagnostic information alone, the dilution effect is consistently
observed. When judgments based on the diagnostic evidence are revised in light of additional, nondi-
agnostic evidence, by contrast, the dilution effect is eliminated or even reversed (yielding a confirma-
tion effect) depending on the type of nondiagnostic evidence under evaluation.
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nostic evidence and different judgment tasks, and their
interaction, on the magnitude of the dilution effect as a
means of better understanding its causes. Although the
dilution effect is a well-established and widely accepted
phenomenon in the research literature on judgment under
uncertainty, our investigation identifies conditions under
which the dilution effect is eliminated or even reversed,
yielding what we refer to as a confirmation effect. While
our results are only preliminary at this point, the identifi-
cation of possible boundary conditions on the occurrence
of the dilution effect may shed light on the judgmental
mechanisms that produce it. In the General Discussion
section, for example, we show that an averaging model
of information integration, which readily reproduces the
basic dilution effect (Troutman & Shanteau, 1977), is
unable to accommodate our results without additional
assumptions regarding changes in how individual pieces
of evidence are interpreted as determined by previously
encountered evidence.
In our investigation, we use the beads and jars task
employed in the Troutman and Shanteau (1977) study.
One advantage of this task is that it gives nondiagnostic
evidence a clear, objective definition—namely, as any
sample of beads that is equally likely to be drawn from
either jar. Arguably, such a task leaves less room for vari-
ance among individuals in their perceptions of the im-
plications of the nondiagnostic evidence than might be
found in perceptions of qualitative evidence of the kind
used, for example, by Nisbett et al. (1981). Relatedly, the
beads and jars task is not subject to the “conversational
norm” critique (e.g., Slugoski & Wilson, 1998; Tetlock,
Lerner, & Boettger, 1996) that has been applied to stud-
ies conducted in more naturalistic, nonstochastic settings
(such as that of Nisbett et al.). According to this critique,
participants feel obliged to adjust their judgments in re-
sponse to nondiagnostic evidence because they assume
that the experimenter would not have presented it if it
were not somehow relevant. This critique holds less force
when applied to the beads and jars task, in which the ev-
idence is generated by a random device rather than by a
human being.
A final advantage of the beads and jars task is that it
allows evaluation of the impact of different types of non-
diagnostic evidence. Specifically, we can distinguish two
types of nondiagnostic evidence: neutral and mixed. The
Troutman and Shanteau (1977) study investigated the
impact of both types of nondiagnostic evidence, though
they used different terms. This distinction is most easily
illustrated by reference to one of the pairs of jars (A and
B) used in our studies (Table 1). Each jar contains a total
of 1,000 beads, each of which is red (R), green (G), blue
(B), or yellow (Y). Beads are always drawn in pairs; that
is, each bead sample consists of a pair of beads. A sam-
ple consisting of a pair of blue beads (BB) is clearly non-
diagnostic with respect to determining whether the sam-
ple was drawn from Jar A or Jar B, because each jar
contains an equal proportion of blue beads. We refer to
the BB sample as an example of neutral nondiagnostic
evidence, because it consists of two beads, each of which
is nondiagnostic on its own and hence neutral in its im-
plications. A sample consisting of one red and one green
bead (RG) is also nondiagnostic, because the red and
green beads occupy complementary proportions of the
two jars and hence drawing exactly one red and one green
bead is equally likely for either jar. We refer to the RG
sample as an example of mixed nondiagnostic evidence
because each bead is diagnostic on its own but with op-
posite implications that effectively “cancel” each other.
Identification of mixed evidence as nondiagnostic might
be more difficult because it requires integrating the con-
flicting implications of individually diagnostic pieces of
information, which is not required for neutral evidence.
Troutman and Shanteau observed comparable degrees of
dilution for both types of nondiagnostic evidence in their
Experiment 1, but may not have had sufficient statistical
power to detect differences between the two. In the pres-
ent study, we directly compare the amount of dilution
produced by the two types of evidence and investigate
how any observed difference between the two varies
across judgment tasks.
One important difference between the Troutman and
Shanteau (1977) and the Nisbett et al. (1981) studies in-
volves the judgment task presented to their participants. As
described above, Troutman and Shanteau used a belief-
revision procedure in which an initial judgment based on
diagnostic evidence is compared with a subsequent revi-
sion of that judgment when additional, nondiagnostic,
evidence is provided. To illustrate, consider our experi-
mental materials, described in Table 1. In the belief-
revision task, the participant makes a first probability
judgment based on an initial, diagnostic, bead sample
(such as RR) and then makes a second, revised, judg-
ment based on an additional, nondiagnostic, bead sample
(such as BB or RG) drawn from the same jar. The dilu-
tion effect is observed if the second judgment is less ex-
treme than the first.
By contrast, the Nisbett et al. (1981) study compared
separately elicited, nonsequential judgments based ei-
ther on diagnostic evidence alone or else on an aggre-
gate of diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence. As ap-
plied to our experimental materials, this approach would
involve a comparison of judgments based on diagnostic
evidence only (such as the bead sample RR), with sepa-
rate judgments based on a combination of diagnostic and
Table 1
Depiction of Jar Cases AB and CD
Case AB Case CD
(Moderate Discriminability) (High Discriminability)
Jar A Jar B Jar C Jar D
Red 270 120 540 60
Green 120 270 60 540
Blue 200 200 200 200
Yellow 410 410 200 200
Total 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
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nondiagnostic evidence (such as the bead samples RRBB
or RRRG). We will refer to this as an aggregate proce-
dure, in which judgments based on two separately eval-
uated bodies of evidence are compared. Troutman and
Shanteau (1977) included two aggregate judgment trials
in their Experiment 2, results from which did not show a
dilution effect (in contrast to the later results of Nisbett
et al.), providing an initial hint that the magnitude of the
dilution effect may depend on whether the judgment task
takes the form of a belief-revision or aggregate proce-
dure. Troutman and Shanteau’s Experiment 2 used only
mixed nondiagnostic evidence, so it remains an open
issue whether similar results would obtain with neutral
evidence.
In the present research, we compared the influence of
nondiagnostic evidence in a belief-revision and an aggre-
gate judgment procedure. If we find that the same non-
diagnostic evidence has a different influence on judg-
ments in the two procedures, it could help to shed light
on the way in which nondiagnostic evidence exerts its in-
fluence. Compared with the aggregate procedure, the
belief-revision procedure seems more likely to prompt
explicit evaluation of the nondiagnostic subset of the ev-
idence on its own, because participants must evaluate
whether and by how much to revise their original judg-
ment (based on the diagnostic subset of the evidence
alone) in light of the additional, nondiagnostic evidence.
In this sense, the belief-revision procedure segregates
the nondiagnostic subset of the evidence in a way that
the aggregate procedure does not. If the dilution effect is
at least partly due to a failure to spontaneously segregate
the nondiagnostic subset of the evidence from the re-
maining, diagnostic evidence, then it should be less pro-
nounced in the belief-revision procedure (where the non-
diagnostic evidence is segregated from the diagnostic
evidence) than in the aggregate procedure (where it is
not). Alternatively, the belief-revision task may encour-
age some kind of adjustment from the initial judgment,
in which case a dilution effect might be more likely for
the belief-revision than for the aggregate task (consistent
with Troutman & Shanteau’s, 1977, results).
Finally, in the present research we can determine whether
our two critical independent variables (evidence type and
task type) exert interacting influences on the magnitude
of the dilution effect, a possibility that has not been
tested in previous research. That is, we can examine
whether judgments based on neutral and mixed nondi-
agnostic evidence are similarly or differently influenced
by whether the judgment task involves a belief-revision
or aggregate procedure. For example, mixed evidence
might be more readily identified as nondiagnostic when
it is segregated from the diagnostic evidence (in the
belief-revision procedure) than when it is not (in the ag-
gregate procedure), while neutral evidence might be
readily identified as nondiagnostic even when it is not
segregated from the diagnostic evidence. As another ex-
ample, a working hypothesis established during the ini-
tial step of the belief-revision procedure (based on the
diagnostic evidence), which is not established in the ag-
gregate procedure, might influence how the participant
evaluates subsequent evidence, particularly if the impli-
cations of that evidence are relatively difficult to assess
(as we suggested might be the case for mixed evidence).
The Troutman and Shanteau (1977) studies focused
on judgments of the hypothesis implicated by the initial,
diagnostic, evidence and showed that such judgments
(which are relatively high when based on the diagnostic
evidence alone) decrease when nondiagnostic evidence
is introduced. The interpretation of this result as a dilu-
tion effect implies that judgments of the nonimplicated
hypothesis (which is made less likely by the initial diag-
nostic evidence) should increase following the addition
of nondiagnostic evidence. That is, a dilution effect should
lead to the implicated hypothesis being judged as less
likely and the nonimplicated hypothesis being judged as
more likely following the introduction of nondiagnostic
evidence. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the latter re-
sult was not directly tested. (Nisbett et al., 1981, did ex-
amine whether judgments of a nonimplicated hypothesis
increased with the addition of nondiagnostic informa-
tion, but found mixed results across their studies, with
the judgments increasing in some experiments but re-
maining unchanged in others.) Without eliciting judg-
ments of the nonimplicated hypothesis, it is not possible
to determine whether the introduction of nondiagnostic
evidence leads to less extreme judgments (as implied by
calling the pattern one of dilution) or instead to generally
lower judgments. In our studies, we also include judg-
ments of the jar not implicated by the initial, diagnostic,
information to provide a complete test of the presumed
dilution pattern.
In short, the key empirical contribution of our studies
is to provide a broader examination of the dilution effect
and the conditions under which it is observed than has
been conducted in previous research. The manner in
which probability judgments are influenced by nondiag-
nostic information is of theoretical significance because
it can help to distinguish alternative models of how people
evaluate and integrate information in making inferential
judgments. One fundamental issue in the study of infor-
mation integration, for example, is whether the process
is best captured by an additive or an averaging model
(e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). The observation of the
dilution effect was taken as evidence favoring the aver-
aging model (Troutman & Shanteau, 1977), since it can
more readily reproduce the effect. (See the Appendix for
an application of additive and averaging models to the
data from our experiments.) Testing the generality of the
dilution effect and identifying its boundary conditions
places additional constraints on the kind of model re-
quired to capture intuitive inferential judgments.
Overview of Experiments
Experiment 1 used an aggregate judgment procedure,
and Experiment 2 used a belief-revision procedure. The
two experiments involved identical beads and jars prob-
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lems, described here, such that judgments were elicited
contingent on the same evidence (diagnostic only, non-
diagnostic only, or a combination of diagnostic and non-
diagnostic) in both experiments.
Information regarding the two critical problems pre-
sented in each experiment is shown in Table 1. Each jar
contains 1,000 beads. Jars A and B are pitted against
each other in Case AB; Jars C and D are pitted against
each other in Case CD. In both cases, the two jars being
compared differ in the number of red (R) and green (G)
beads that they contain. This difference is more pro-
nounced in Case CD (9:1 ratio of R:G and G:R beads for
Jars C and D, respectively) than in Case AB (7:3 ratio of
R:G and G:R beads for Jars C and D, respectively), mean-
ing that drawing a red (green) bead provides stronger ev-
idence for Jar C (D) in Case CD than it does for Jar A (B)
in Case AB. This allows us to establish the generaliz-
ability of our results over varying levels of diagnosticity
associated with the diagnostic portion of the evidence.
In both cases, there is an equal number of blue (B) beads
in each jar, meaning that drawing one or more blue beads
is nondiagnostic with respect to discriminating between
either pair of jars. Each jar also contained yellow (Y)
beads, which occurred in equal numbers within a case
but were more prevalent in Case AB than in Case CD.
For a given case, participants were told that one of the
two jars would be selected at random and samples of
beads would be drawn from that jar. On the basis of the
bead samples, participants were asked to judge the prob-
ability that a designated jar was the one from which the
samples were being drawn. The “target” jar thus desig-
nated was determined on a randomized basis on each
trial. Participants judged the probability that the bead
sample had been drawn from the target jar rather than
from the alternative, nontarget jar on a 0% to 100% prob-
ability scale.
Beads were always drawn in pairs. In either Case AB or
Case CD, drawing an RG bead pair is nondiagnostic with
respect to discriminating between the two jars because red
and green beads occupy complementary proportions in
both; we refer to the RG bead pair as mixed evidence.
Drawing a BB bead pair is also nondiagnostic; we refer to
the BB pair as neutral evidence. (A pair of yellow beads
would also be considered neutral evidence, but no such
pairs were presented as evidence in our experiments.)
In addition to these two nondiagnostic bead pairs, par-
ticipants also encountered four different diagnostic bead
pairs: RR, GG, RY, and GY. Judgments were elicited
contingent on each bead pair (diagnostic or nondiagnos-
tic) on its own, and also for each possible combination of
a diagnostic bead pair and a nondiagnostic bead pair.
(The order in which the two beads within a pair were pre-
sented was also counterbalanced.) There are eight possible
ways of combining the four diagnostic and two nondiag-
nostic bead pairs. Each combination can be presented
with the diagnostic pair first (Order 1, e.g., RRRG) or
with the nondiagnostic pair first (Order 2, e.g., RGRR),
yielding 16 four-bead samples: RRRG, GGRG, RYRG,
GYRG, RRBB GGBB, RYBB,GYBB, RGRR, RGGG,
RGRY, RGGY, BBRR, BBGG, BBRY, BBGY.
For each of these four-bead samples, two judgments
were elicited, one contingent on the first pair of beads and
the second contingent on both pairs taken together. The
timing with which these two judgments were elicited is
the fundamental procedural distinction between Experi-
ments 1 and 2. Using the first four-bead sample (RRRG)
as an example, the aggregate procedure (Experiment 1)
would involve eliciting separate nonconsecutive judg-
ments contingent on the first pair (RR) and on all four
beads (RRRG). The belief-revision procedure (Experi-
ment 2) would involve eliciting a judgment contingent
on the first pair (RR) followed by a revised judgment
contingent on the addition of the second pair (RG). In
terms of experimental design, trials were blocked by
number of beads in the sample (two or four) in the ag-
gregate procedure of Experiment 1, and by four-bead
sample in the belief-revision procedure of Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 1
Aggregate Procedure
Several studies demonstrating the dilution effect have
compared judgments based on diagnostic evidence only
with completely separate judgments based on a mix of
diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence (Nisbett et al.,
1981; Zukier, 1982; Zukier & Jennings, 1983). In this
experiment, the aggregate samples (e.g., RRRG) were
divided into two blocks so that judgments would be based
on the first two beads in one block (e.g., RR) and on four
beads (e.g., RRRG) in the other. The question we inves-
tigated was whether the two types of nondiagnostic evi-
dence, mixed (RG) and neutral (BB), would produce a
comparable degree of dilution. We suspected that the
size of the effect might generally be larger for the RG
pair because the nondiagnosticity of this pair is intu-
itively less obvious than is the case for the BB pair.
Method
Participants. Seventy-one students enrolled in an introductory
psychology class participated in this study for partial fulfillment of
their course requirements. Data from 7 participants were excluded
from the analyses for the following reasons: (1) accuracy analyses re-
vealed that 3 participants were outliers (on average, judgments devi-
ated by more than .25 from the corresponding Bayesian calculation);
(2) 2 participants failed to finish the task; (3) 1 participant entered the
same four numbers (1–4) for most of the trials; and (4) 1 participant
was excluded because she reported that she entered the same re-
sponse for all of the trials in the second half of the experiment.
Stimuli. For the practice phase, a turntable and two jars with
varying proportions of red, green, blue, and yellow beads were
used. For the test phase, the bead samples and the competing jars
were presented on an IBM-compatible computer.
Practice phase. The experiment began with a physical demon-
stration of the bead-sampling procedure that would subsequently
be simulated in the computerized task. Two clear jars, with varying
proportions of colored beads, were used. The ratio of R:G:B:Y
(red:green:blue:yellow) beads in the two jars was as follows: Jar 1,
400:100:200:300; and Jar 2, 100:400:200:300. There were a total of
1,000 beads per jar. The surface of a turntable was divided into two
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equal sections and the two jars were placed on each side of this di-
viding line. The composition of these jars was illustrated on a
screen concealing the turntable. Behind the screen, the experi-
menter proceeded to spin the table. Simultaneously, the participant
chose a slip of paper, with an illustration of the target jar (to which
the participant would be asked to assign a probability). The table
ceased spinning with an arrow pointing to the selected jar. The ex-
perimenter then drew two beads from the selected container. After
seeing the drawn beads, the participant was asked to make a prob-
ability judgment, between 0% and 100%, that the beads were in fact
drawn from the target jar indicated by the slip of paper, rather than
from the remaining, nontarget, jar. The same process was then re-
peated with a new jar being selected, but this time, four beads were
drawn from the selected jar. This was followed by an additional
two- and four-bead practice trial. No feedback was provided after
each trial.
Test phase. Following this practice phase, participants were told
that the same general procedure would be simulated on a computer for
the rest of the experiment. Instructions on completing the computer-
based task were then provided. Each participant made judgments
for two jar cases (Cases AB and CD), shown in Table 1. Participants
either received the two-bead block first followed by the four-bead
block, or vice versa. Within each block, two subblock orders were
used: AB, CD; or CD, AB. The same subblock order was used for
each block. For each subblock, the composition of the two jars
under consideration was shown on the screen and the participants
were presented with samples of either two or four beads. For the
four-bead block, 16 aggregate bead samples were presented (RRRG,
GGRG, RYRG, GYRG, RRBB, GGBB, RYBB, GYBB, RGRR,
RGGG, RGRY, RGGY, BBRR, BBGG, BBRY, BBGY). For the
two-bead block, participants were presented with only the first pair
of beads from the four-bead strings so that for half of the trials, par-
ticipants received a diagnostic pair on its own (e.g., RR, GG, RY,
and GY) and on the remaining half of the trials, they received a non-
diagnostic pair only (e.g., RG and BB). Each jar under consideration
served as the target jar for each sample at some point during each
subblock, in a randomly determined fashion so that the target jar
varied from trial to trial. Participants judged the probability that the
sample had been drawn from the target jar (which was designated
by a box drawn around it) rather than from the remaining nontarget
jar. In total, 128 judgments were obtained from each participant.
Results
Bead samples including yellow beads were presented to
maintain the plausibility of our cover story to participants
that the samples were drawn randomly from the jars. Our
analysis, however, focused on samples involving only
red, green, and blue beads because these samples were
the closest to the ones analyzed in the original Troutman
and Shanteau (1977) study. Thus, we concentrated our
analysis on eight sample pairs (RR–RRRG, GG–GGRG,
RR–RRBB, GG–GGBB, RG–RGRR, RG–RGGG, BB–
BBRR, and BB–BBGG).
Mean judgments. We analyzed the first four sample
pairs, RR–RRRG, GG–GGRG, RR–RRBB, and GG–
GGBB (Order 1 samples, where the diagnostic portion
of the evidence was presented first in the aggregate sam-
ple) to determine whether participants’ judgments based
on the aggregate samples (e.g., RRRG) were diluted
compared with those based on samples containing the di-
agnostic information alone (e.g., RR).
Table 2 reports the means and the results from a sim-
ple effects analysis. For this analysis, the data were col-
lapsed across the diagnostic portion (RR and GG) of the
evidence. Taking the AB case as an example, the first
cell (72.0 1.7) represents participants’ mean responses
(and 95% confidence interval) to (1) RR when evaluat-
ing Jar A and (2) GG when evaluating Jar B, since Jars
A and B, respectively, are the ones that are implicated by
the corresponding diagnostic evidence. The next cell
(68.6 2.6) contains the mean (and 95% confidence in-
terval) for the corresponding judgment based on the
four-bead RG sample (i.e., RRRG and GGRG). Like-
wise, the third cell (29.1 1.9) represents participants’
responses to (1) RR when evaluating Jar B and (2) GG
when evaluating Jar A, since Jars B and A, respectively,
are the ones that are not implicated by the corresponding
diagnostic evidence. Again, the following cell (28.1 2.0)
contains the mean for the corresponding judgment based
on the four-bead RG sample (i.e., RRRG and GGRG).
Table 2 indicates that both the mixed RG and neutral
BB types of nondiagnostic evidence tended to produce a
dilution pattern, in which the implicated jar’s judged
probability decreased and the nonimplicated jar’s judged
probability increased when RG and BB appeared in the
aggregate samples. For each of the four critical sample pairs
(RR–RRRG, GG–GGRG, RR–RRBB, and GG–GGBB),
the difference between the judgment based on diagnos-
tic information only and the corresponding judgment
based on a combination of diagnostic and nondiagnostic
information was subjected to a 2 (diagnostic evidence:
RR vs. GG)  2 (nondiagnostic evidence: RG vs. BB) 
2 (target jar: implicated vs. nonimplicated)  2 (case: AB
vs. CD) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
In addition to a main effect of jar produced by the dilu-
tion effect [F(1,63)  31.16, MSe  900, p  .01], there
were two statistically significant interactions. First, a
relatively stronger dilution effect was obtained for the
neutral (BB) than for the mixed (RG) nondiagnostic ev-
idence, as reflected by the nondiagnostic evidence  tar-
get jar interaction [F(1,63)  10.69, MSe  375, p 
Table 2
Mean Probability Judgment Assigned to the Target Jar
(Implicated or Nonimplicated) Based on Diagnostic Evidence
Alone or on Diagnostic and Nondiagnostic Evidence, Along
With Their Difference (95% Confidence Interval) and
Associated Simple Effects Test, for Mixed (RG) and Neutral
(BB) Nondiagnostic Evidence in Experiment 1, Presented
Separately for Each Case (AB and CD)
Judged Probability
Case ND Sample Jar D only DND Difference
AB RG implicated 72.0 68.6 3.3 3.3*
nonimplicated 29.1 28.1 0.9 3.1
BB implicated 71.1 66.5 4.7 2.4**
nonimplicated 30.3 36.1 5.8 3.2**
CD RG implicated 83.4 78.3 5.1 3.9**
nonimplicated 17.4 22.9 5.5 4.9*
BB implicated 83.1 74.0 9.2 3.1**
nonimplicated 18.9 28.1 9.2 4.7**
Note—D, diagnostic bead sample; ND, nondiagnostic bead sample; 
R, red; G, green; B, blue. *p  .05. **p  .01.
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.01]. Second, relatively stronger dilution effects were ob-
served when RG and BB followed more highly diagnos-
tic data (i.e., in the CD case as compared with the AB
case), as reflected by the case  target jar interaction
[F(1,63)  7.08, MSe  591, p  .05]. The stronger di-
lution effect for the neutral than for the mixed nondiag-
nostic evidence was also evident when each case was an-
alyzed separately for the AB case [F(1,63)  10.46,
MSe  201, p  .01] and for the CD case [F(1,63) 
4.86, MSe  393, p  .05]. No other effects were statis-
tically significant in this analysis.
To ensure that the RG and BB samples alone were in-
deed viewed as equally supportive of both hypotheses,
we examined judgments from all of the trials in which a
RG and BB pair appeared on its own. As expected, for
each case, each of the competing hypotheses was judged
as approximately equally likely (M  50.1% for the four
critical Order 2 samples).
Ordinal analysis. The variance in judged probability
both within and between participants can be quite high,
and consequently the pattern of means depicted in Table 2
may not provide a completely accurate depiction of the
typical judgment pattern of the typical individual. One
way of reducing such variance while still examining the
key questions of interest is to focus on the direction
rather than the magnitude of differences between judg-
ments based on diagnostic evidence alone versus a com-
bination of diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence. Thus,
in addition to examining the means, we also looked at
the frequency with which participants gave less extreme
judgments for the four-bead samples (e.g., RRRG and
RRBB) than for the diagnostic samples alone (e.g., RR).
For each of the four critical sample pairs (RR–RRRG,
GG–GGRG, RR–RRBB, and GG–GGBB), we counted
the number of times a participant’s judgment based on
the aggregate sample was higher, lower, or the same as
his/her judgment based on the diagnostic sample alone.
The results, collapsed across the diagnostic portion RR
and GG, are reported in Table 3. Items in boldface indi-
cate the number of trials in which the direction of the dif-
ference is consistent with the general dilution pattern of
results shown by the mean data. Generally speaking, for
both nondiagnostic pairs (RG and BB), judgments of the
jar implicated by the evidence decrease toward 50% and
judgments of the jar not implicated by the evidence in-
crease toward 50% for the four-bead aggregate samples
relative to the diagnostic pair-only counterparts. This
analysis shows that the trends revealed in the pattern of
mean judgments are not the result of a few participants
giving extreme judgments (or of a number of partici-
pants each giving a few extreme judgments) but instead
characterize most of the judgments of most participants
in the experiment.
Discussion
In a comparison of the judgments based on the diag-
nostic portion only (e.g., RR) with separate judgments
based on the mixed sample of diagnostic and nondiag-
nostic evidence (e.g., RRRG, RRBB), the dilution pat-
tern was observed. In this aggregate procedure, the pres-
ence of RG or BB in the four-bead samples reduced the
impact of the diagnostic portion on the extremity of peo-
ple’s judgments.
One surprising aspect of the results is that the BB
sample produced a stronger dilution effect than did the
RG sample. This finding is surprising because, intu-
itively, it should have been easier to give normative judg-
ments for the aggregate samples including the BB pair.
Presumably, when individuals are presented with a sam-
ple of beads, they segregate the sample according to
color. Thus, when BB is included in the four-bead sam-
ples, participants could segregate the beads into two
groups. For example, RRBB was most likely perceived
as two red beads and two blue beads, making salient the
nondiagnostic BB pair in the sample. In contrast, when
RG was the nondiagnostic pair, the samples were likely
to have been segregated differently. For example, RRRG
was likely to have been perceived as three red beads and
one green bead, not as a diagnostic pair RR and a nondi-
agnostic pair RG. Segregated this way, the nondiagnos-
ticity of the RG pair is not highlighted. The observed di-
lution for the BB pair is important because it suggests
that even though the BB pair is perceptually segregated
from the diagnostic pair in the four-bead sample, indi-
viduals were still influenced by this evidence.
EXPERIMENT 2
Belief-Revision Procedure
Perhaps the normative requirement to ignore nondiag-
nostic evidence—particularly the obviously neutral BB
sample—is more easily put into practice when the judg-
ment task prompts evaluation of its implications in iso-
lation from that of the diagnostic portion of the evidence.
This possibility can be tested through the use of a belief-
revision procedure. Instead of separating the sample
pairs (e.g., RR–RRRG) into two blocks, we investigated
whether participants would be more inclined to ignore
Table 3
Frequency With Which Probability Judgment Assigned to
Target Jar (Implicated or Nonimplicated) Increased,
Decreased, or Remained Unchanged in Response to
Nondiagnostic (Mixed RG or Neutral BB) Evidence in
Experiment 1, Listed Separately for Each Case (AB and CD)
Change in Judged Probability
Case ND Sample Jar Increase Decrease Same
AB RG implicated 44 64 20
nonimplicated 53 58 17
BB implicated 29 72 27
nonimplicated 84 31 13
CD RG implicated 35 65 28
nonimplicated 63 31 34
BB implicated 14 87 27
nonimplicated 88 18 22
Note—ND, nondiagnostic; R, red; G, green; B, blue. Bold entries reflect
the predominant pattern of results.
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the neutral (BB) and mixed (RG) types of nondiagnostic
evidence if it directly followed an assessment of the di-
agnostic portion of the evidence. Thus, using a belief-
revision procedure in Experiment 2, we examined whether
individuals would alter their initial judgments (based on
a piece of diagnostic information alone, e.g., RR) when
presented with additional mixed (RG) or neutral (BB)
nondiagnostic evidence. Troutman and Shanteau (1977)
reported comparable degrees of dilution for both types
of evidence but, as noted in the introduction, they did not
elicit judgments of the nonimplicated hypothesis and
also may not have had sufficient statistical power to de-
tect differences between judgments based on the two
types of evidence.
Method
Participants. Thirty-five undergraduates enrolled in introduc-
tory psychology participated in this study for partial fulfillment of
their course requirements. Data from 2 participants were excluded
from the analyses for entering the same probability value for the
majority of the trials in the experiment. Data from a 3rd participant
were omitted because he/she was revealed to be an outlier in the ac-
curacy analyses (on average, judgments deviated by more than .25
from the Bayesian calculation).
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1.
Practice phase. This phase of the experiment was almost iden-
tical to that in Experiment 1, except for the change from an aggre-
gate procedure to a belief-revision procedure. As before, the ex-
perimenter drew two beads from the selected jar. After seeing the
drawn beads, the participant was asked to make a probability judg-
ment, between 0% and 100%, that the two beads were in fact drawn
from the target jar indicated by the slip of paper, rather than the re-
maining, nontarget, jar. Two additional beads were then drawn from
the same selected jar and the participant was asked to provide a re-
vised probability judgment based on all four beads. The same se-
quence of events was repeated so that by the end of the practice
phase, the participant had completed 2 two-step practice trials.
Test phase. Participants made 64 pairs of judgments corre-
sponding exactly to the 128 aggregate judgments obtained in Ex-
periment 1. The only difference was that each sample was now pre-
sented in two steps. As in the practice phase, after the participant
provided a judgment based on the first pair of beads (e.g., RR), a
second pair of beads (e.g., RG) was presented so that the partici-
pant’s final judgment was based on all four beads (e.g., RRRG). Of
interest were the Order 1 samples, where a diagnostic piece of infor-
mation (e.g., RR) was followed by a nondiagnostic piece of informa-
tion (e.g., RG or BB). We were interested in whether individuals
would alter their initial judgments (based on a piece of diagnostic
information alone, e.g., RR) when presented with mixed (RG) or
neutral (BB) nondiagnostic evidence at Step 2. Two block orders
were used: AB, CD; and CD, AB. For each block, the jars under
consideration were shown on the screen and the participants were
presented with two-step sequences of bead pairs, in a random order.
Each jar under consideration served as the target jar for each sam-
ple at some point during each subblock, in a randomly determined
fashion so that the target jar varied from trial to trial. Participants
judged the probability that the sample had been drawn from the tar-
get jar (which was designated by a box drawn around it), rather than
from the other, nontarget, jar. In total, 64 pairs of judgments were
obtained from each participant.
Results
Mean judgments. We concentrated our analysis on the
same eight sample pairs as in Experiment 1 (RR–RRRG,
GG–GGRG, RR–RRBB, GG–GGBB, RG–RGRR, RG–
RGGG, BB–BBRR, and BB–BBGG). With the belief-
revision procedure instead of the aggregate procedure,
Troutman and Shanteau’s (1977) dilution effect was not
replicated for either nondiagnostic pair of beads (RG and
BB). Surprisingly, as shown in Table 4, we obtained a
consistent pattern of results across both cases: The prob-
ability judgment for the jar that was initially favored by
the diagnostic pair of beads actually increased after the
nondiagnostic mixed pair RG was presented, while the
probability judgments for the remaining, nonimplicated,
jar decreased. We will refer to this pattern of results as
confirmation because the initial judgments became more
extreme with the introduction of the mixed evidence. In
contrast, the neutral BB pair of beads did not have any
impact on the original judgment for the majority of sam-
ples. We interpreted this result as indicating that the BB
pair of beads was perceived as being nondiagnostic and
hence was ignored.
For each of the four critical sample pairs (RR–RRRG,
GG–GGRG, RR–RRBB, and GG–GGBB), the change
between the initial judgment, based on diagnostic infor-
mation only, and the subsequent judgment, based on a
combination of diagnostic and nondiagnostic informa-
tion, was subjected to a 2 (diagnostic evidence: RR vs.
GG)  2 (nondiagnostic evidence: RG vs. BB)  2 (tar-
get jar: implicated vs. nonimplicated)  2 (case: AB vs.
CD) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a statisti-
cally significant nondiagnostic evidence  target jar
interaction [F(1,31)  16.83, MSe  260, p  .01], re-
flecting the tendency for mixed nondiagnostic evidence
but not neutral evidence to produce a confirmation ef-
fect. This interaction was also statistically significant
when each case was analyzed separately for the AB case
[F(1,31)  12.26, MSe  116, p  .01] and for the CD
case [F(1,31)  15.36, MSe  202, p  .01] The confir-
mation effect for mixed evidence was sufficiently strong
to produce an overall main effect of target jar [F(1,31) 
Table 4
Mean Probability Judgment Assigned to the Target Jar
(Implicated or Nonimplicated) Based on Diagnostic Evidence
Alone or on Diagnostic and Nondiagnostic Evidence, Along
With Their Difference (95% Confidence Interval) and
Associated Simple Effects Test, for Mixed (RG) and Neutral
(BB) Nondiagnostic Evidence in Experiment 2, Presented
Separately for Each Case (AB and CD)
Judged Probability
Case ND Sample Jar D only DND Difference
AB RG implicated 67.0 69.4 2.4 3.9
nonimplicated 32.8 26.4 6.4 2.7**
BB implicated 65.1 65.2 0.1 2.4
nonimplicated 31.9 32.6 0.8 2.1
CD RG implicated 78.2 82.3 4.1 4.6
nonimplicated 25.2 19.4 5.8 3.5**
BB implicated 77.6 75.2 2.4 2.6
nonimplicated 24.9 26.5 1.7 2.3
Note—D, diagnostic bead sample; ND, nondiagnostic bead sample; R,
red; G, green; B, blue. *p  .05. **p  .01.
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9.91, MSe  159, p  .01]. No other effects were statis-
tically significant in this analysis.
The pattern of mean judgments (and, to a lesser extent,
the ordinal analysis reported next) reveals an apparent
asymmetric contribution to the confirmation effect by
judgments made for the nonimplicated versus the impli-
cated jar, with the probability assigned to the nonimpli-
cated jar decreasing by a larger amount than the proba-
bility assigned to the implicated jar increases following
the introduction of nondiagnostic evidence. While we
have no specific explanation for this asymmetry, it may
help to explain why past research—which, as noted in
the introduction, generally did not involve judgments of
the nonimplicated hypothesis—has not previously docu-
mented the confirmation effect reported here.
To ensure that the RG and BB samples alone were in-
deed perceived as nondiagnostic, we looked at all of the
trials in which a RG or BB pair appeared first. Under
these circumstances, each of the competing hypotheses
was judged as approximately equally likely on Step 1
(M  49.5% for the four critical Order 2 samples).
Ordinal analysis. In addition to examining the means,
we also looked at the frequency with which participants
altered their judgments in an upward or downward direc-
tion at Step 2, regardless of the magnitude of the revision.
For each intertrial (Judgment 1 to Judgment 2) compar-
ison for the Order 1 samples (in which the diagnostic
portion of the evidence was presented first), we counted
the number of times the revised judgment (relative to the
initial response) increased, decreased, or remained un-
changed with the introduction of the nondiagnostic RG
or BB pair at Step 2. The results, again collapsed across
the diagnostic portion RR and GG, are reported in Table 5.
Items in boldface indicate the number of trials in which
the direction of change is consistent with the general pat-
tern of results shown by the mean data. For the nondiag-
nostic pair RG, judgments of the jar implicated by the
evidence increase away from 50% and judgments of the
nonimplicated jar decrease away from 50%. For the non-
diagnostic pair BB, the majority of the judgments remain
unchanged. This analysis shows that the trends revealed
in the pattern of mean judgments characterize most of
the judgments of most participants in the experiment.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 show that individuals’
probability judgments became more extreme after the
mixed (RG) evidence was presented and remained un-
changed with the introduction of the neutral (BB) evi-
dence. The mixed evidence result was in the opposite di-
rection of that reported by Troutman and Shanteau (1977).
One possible interpretation of this finding is that our
participants tentatively generated a working hypothesis
about which jar was more likely, given the evidence on
Step 1, and then interpreted the RG pair in a biased man-
ner that exaggerated its compatibility with the working
hypothesis. Russo, Meloy, and Medvec (1998) docu-
mented a similar effect in the domain of preference for-
mation, in which initial information supporting a partic-
ular choice option leads to distorted impressions of later
information biased in favor of the initially supported op-
tion. Although our experiment does not directly corre-
spond to the studies reported in the confirmation bias lit-
erature (for a review, see Nickerson, 1998), the standard
interpretation of such studies is consistent with our find-
ing for the mixed (RG) pair: People are more sensitive to,
or give greater weight to, evidence that confirms their
currently held beliefs. When evaluating mixed evidence,
on this account, participants first generated a hypothesis
about which jar was most likely given the initial evi-
dence, and then they interpreted new evidence in a bi-
ased, confirmatory manner. The process underlying this
effect is not clear. One possibility is that participants
evaluated each bead separately. Thus, the one bead (e.g.,
R) in the RG pair that on its own favors the most likely
jar (e.g., the predominantly red jar, in this case) was
given greater weight, relative to its counterpart (e.g., G)
when RG followed a RR pair than when it followed a GG
pair. Further studies are required in order to identify
more clearly the process underlying this effect.
Apparently, the belief-revision procedure used in Ex-
periment 2 blocked the dilution effect otherwise obtained
using the aggregate procedure in Experiment 1. This
suggests that dilution occurs because individuals do not
spontaneously segregate the evidence (e.g., RRRG) into
its diagnostic and nondiagnostic components when it is
presented in an aggregate format. When the evidence is
segregated in a manner that requires separate evaluation
of the diagnostic and nondiagnostic portions of the evi-
dence (using a belief-revision procedure), individuals
can readily identify the neutral BB sample as being non-
diagnostic, thus leaving their initial judgment unchanged.
In contrast, it may be less intuitively obvious, even with
this segregation, that the mixed RG sample can be safely
ignored in the revised judgment; instead, the mixed evi-
dence apparently increases individuals’ confidence in
their working hypothesis under such circumstances, pro-
ducing a pattern opposite of the dilution effect, which we
have called a confirmation effect.
Table 5
Frequency With Which Probability Judgment Assigned to
Target Jar (Implicated or Nonimplicated) Increased,
Decreased, or Remained Unchanged in Response to
Nondiagnostic (Mixed RG or Neutral BB) Evidence in
Experiment 2, Listed Separately for Each Case (AB and CD)
Change in Judged Probability
Case ND Sample Jar Increase Decrease Same
AB RG implicated 35 17 12
nonimplicated 6 45 13
BB implicated 11 9 44
nonimplicated 11 6 47
CD RG implicated 36 12 16
nonimplicated 9 39 16
BB implicated 9 15 40
nonimplicated 13 9 42
Note—ND, nondiagnostic; R, red; G, green; B, blue. Bold entries reflect
the predominant pattern of results.
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FOLLOW-UP STUDIES
We conducted two follow-up studies that established
the generalizability of the results from Experiment 2
over various changes in how the evidence is presented to
participants, how the response scale is represented, and
the anchor value for the response at Step 2 of the belief-
revision procedure. In light of the inconsistency between
our results in Experiment 2 and the results of Troutman
and Shanteau’s (1977) original study, despite their very
similar experimental design, we designed the follow-up
studies to investigate three seemingly minor ways in
which our experimental procedure differed from theirs.
First, in the Troutman and Shanteau (1977) study, par-
ticipants recorded on a sheet of paper (using letters to
represent colors) the colors of the beads drawn in the
first sample, which they referred to in revising their
judgment when the second sample was drawn; by con-
trast, in our study, colored circles presented on the com-
puter screen were used to represent the results of both
draws. It is conceivable that the letter-based representa-
tion of the first drawn led participants in Troutman and
Shanteau to place greater weight on the more salient sec-
ond bead sample when making their revised judgments
(see Shanteau, 1975). To test this, in our first follow-up
study (N  64), one group of participants was presented
with a belief-revision task in which the results of the first
bead sample were represented by letters rather than col-
ored circles when the results of the second draw were
presented at Step 2; another group was presented with
the same representation (colored circles) used in Exper-
iment 2. Results indicate that this factor exerted no sys-
tematic influence on people’s judgments [F(1,60)  0.60,
MSe  509].
Second, in the Troutman and Shanteau (1977) study,
the sliding response marker used to elicit judgments was
reset to the midpoint of the response scale prior to elic-
iting the revised judgment in Step 2; by contrast, in our
experiment, the initial judgment at Step 1 served as the
starting point or anchor for the revised judgment elicited
at Step 2. It is possible that Troutman and Shanteau’s
procedure induced an anchoring effect drawing Step 2
judgments toward the center of the scale (but see Shanteau,
1975, Experiment 2) and in this manner produced or en-
hanced the dilution effect. Our first follow-up study also
investigated this possibility, by comparing Step 2 judg-
ments anchored at the response scale midpoint (i.e.,
50%) with Step 2 judgments anchored at the initial Step 1
judgment. Results indicate that this factor also exerted
no systematic influence on people’s judgments [F(1,60) 
0.65, MSe  509].
Third, Troutman and Shanteau (1977) used what might
be called a “complementary” response scale representa-
tion in which the 100% end of the scale was labeled as
“definitely from the (predominantly) white jar” and 0%
was labeled as “definitely from the (predominantly) red
jar.” By contrast, our experiments used a noncomple-
mentary scale representation in which 100% was labeled
as “definitely from the target jar” and 0% was labeled as
“definitely not from the target jar.” Scale representation
could conceivably influence how the evidence is inter-
preted (e.g., McKenzie, 1998). To test this possibility, in
a second follow-up study (N  32), we compared judg-
ments made on the same labeled response scale used in
Experiments 1 and 2 with judgments made on a “com-
plementary” response scale in which each end of the
scale was associated with one of the competing hypotheses
(i.e., jars; the 100% end of the scale was labeled with a
picture of the target jar, and the 0% end of the scale was
labeled with a picture of the alternative jar). Results in-
dicate that this factor did not exert a systematic influence
on people’s judgments [F(1,30)  0.47, MSe  330].
Because the results from the follow-up studies exhib-
ited a similar pattern of judgments across the various
task manipulations we conducted, we can collapse the
results across these manipulations and assess whether
the general pattern of results obtained in Experiment 2
are replicated. The ordinal analysis (Table 6) of the di-
rection of changes in judgments following the introduc-
tion of nondiagnostic evidence shows a pattern of results
similar to that of Experiment 2. For the mixed evidence
pair RG, responses to the jar implicated by the evidence
increases away from 50% and those to the jar not impli-
cated by the evidence decreases away from 50%, repli-
cating the confirmation effect observed in the previous
experiment. For the neutral evidence pair BB, the ma-
jority of the responses remained unchanged from those
based on the diagnostic portion of the evidence alone.
As with the data from the previous experiment, the
difference between the initial judgment based on diag-
nostic information and the revised judgment based on
additional nondiagnostic information was subjected to a
2 (diagnostic evidence: RR vs. GG)  2 (nondiagnostic
evidence: RG vs. BB)  2 (target jar: implicated vs. non-
implicated)  2 (case: AB vs. CD) repeated measures
ANOVA. Once again, there was a statistically significant
nondiagnostic evidence  target jar interaction [F(1,95) 
Table 6
Frequency With Which Probability Judgment Assigned to
Target Jar (Implicated or Nonimplicated) Increased,
Decreased, or Remained Unchanged in Response to
Nondiagnostic (Mixed RG or Neutral BB) Evidence in
Collapsed Data From the Two Follow-up Studies, Listed
Separately for Each Case (AB and CD)
Change in Judged Probability
Case ND Sample Jar Increase Decrease Same
AB RG implicated 97 53 42
nonimplicated 47 107 38
BB implicated 32 47 113
nonimplicated 59 21 112
CD RG implicated 91 55 46
nonimplicated 64 93 35
BB implicated 27 61 104
nonimplicated 62 32 98
Note—ND, nondiagnostic; R, red; G, green; B, blue. Bold entries reflect
the predominant pattern of results.
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28.67, MSe  175, p  .01], reflecting the tendency for
mixed nondiagnostic evidence but not neutral evidence
to produce a confirmation effect. This interaction was
also statistically significant when each case was analyzed
separately for the AB case [F(1,95)  28.52, MSe  128,
p  .01] and for the CD case [F(1,95)  15.42, MSe 
212, p  .01]. Examination of the mean differences again
reveals a confirmation effect induced by exposure to the
mixed (RG) evidence, though the magnitude of this ef-
fect was smaller than that observed in Experiment 2. On
average, exposure to the neutral (BB) evidence produced
a trend toward dilution, even though the ordinal analysis
revealed that the majority of the judgments remained un-
changed following its introduction; of the minority of
judgments that were changed in response to the BB pair,
however, about two thirds were in the direction of dilu-
tion rather than confirmation, thus pulling the means in
this direction as well (Table 6).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results of the present studies indicate that the influ-
ence of nondiagnostic evidence depends on the type of
judgment task in which it is encountered. We investi-
gated the impact of two types of nondiagnostic bodies of
evidence: (1) neutral evidence, in which each individual
component fails to discriminate among the competing
hypotheses; and (2) mixed evidence, consisting of indi-
vidually diagnostic components that, taken together, fail
to discriminate among the competing hypotheses. Both
types of nondiagnostic evidence produced dilution in the
aggregate judgment procedure of Experiment 1. By con-
trast, they produced divergent effects in the belief-revision
judgment procedure used in the second experiment, with
neither type of nondiagnostic evidence producing dilu-
tion. Instead, the neutral evidence was effectively ig-
nored, as required by probability theory, while the mixed
evidence produced an apparent confirmation effect so
that judgments became more extreme (rather than less
extreme, as in the dilution effect) with the introduction
of the mixed nondiagnostic evidence. Results from two
follow-up studies largely replicated the results of the sec-
ond experiment and ruled out several procedural vari-
ables as the cause of our inability to replicate the results
of Troutman and Shanteau (1977). Although further re-
search is clearly required, we conclude with a few spec-
ulations regarding the judgmental processes underlying
the pattern of results observed in our studies.
The key distinction between the aggregate and belief-
revision procedures is that the nondiagnostic portion of
the evidence is segregated from the diagnostic portion of
the evidence in the latter but not in the former. As a re-
sult, only in the belief-revision procedure is there an ex-
plicit prompt to evaluate separately the implications of
the nondiagnostic portion of the evidence in terms of
how it should modify one’s conclusions based on the pre-
viously introduced diagnostic portion of the evidence.
When segregated in this manner, neutral and mixed non-
diagnostic evidence appear to be interpreted as having
quite different implications, even though both produce
dilution in the aggregate judgment procedure.
When evaluated in isolation, both the mixed bead sam-
ple RG and the neutral bead sample BB were rated by the
majority of our participants as providing equal support
for the competing hypotheses (i.e., jars), in that both
were assigned approximately equal probabilities of very
close to 50%. This observation, however, does not neces-
sarily imply recognition of the general statistical principle
that either nondiagnostic sample can be safely ignored
in rendering a judgment. Indeed, if people recognized
and applied that principle in a consistent fashion, then
nondiagnostic evidence would not have any systematic
influence on their judgments. We suggest that the judge
will attempt to apply this principle only when the nondi-
agnostic portion of the evidence is (1) segregated from
the diagnostic portion of the evidence and then (2) clas-
sified as information that can be ignored. Even under
those conditions, the judge will be able to render judg-
ments that are invariant over the presence or absence of
the nondiagnostic portion of the evidence only if he/she
is actually able to ignore the nondiagnostic evidence—
that is, avoid having it influence his/her judgment, which
other research suggests is often a difficult goal to achieve
(e.g., Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
Our previous discussion implies that condition (1) is
more likely to be met in the belief-revision procedure
than in the aggregate judgment procedure. Likewise, on
the basis of our earlier discussion of the relative ease
with which the nondiagnosticity of neutral evidence can
be detected compared with that of mixed evidence, it
seems that condition (2) is more likely to be met in the
case of neutral evidence than in the case of mixed evi-
dence. Taken together, then, we might expect nondiag-
nostic evidence to be successfully ignored when neutral
evidence is evaluated in a belief-revision task, which is
indeed the only set of circumstances under which nondi-
agnostic evidence was observed to have no systematic
impact on judgments in our investigation. Once the judge
decides to ignore the neutral evidence, actually doing so is
straightforward in the belief-revision procedure because
the previous judgment made on the basis of the diagnos-
tic portion of the evidence alone is readily available.
What happens when condition (1) is not met—that is,
when the nondiagnostic portion of the evidence is not
segregated from the diagnostic portion of the evidence?
If no attempt is made to selectively disregard or ignore
certain components of a body of evidence, then the judge
must integrate the implications of each into a final as-
sessment of the extent to which the body of evidence as
a whole supports a particular hypothesis relative to its
competitors. A number of researchers have developed
models to describe the integration process, many of which
adopt an averaging method of integration (e.g., Ander-
son, 1981; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). If we assume that
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each component in the neutral body of evidence is as-
signed a value of zero (e.g., 0 for each B in Bead Sam-
ple BB), and the conflicting components in the mixed
body of evidence are assigned values with opposite sign
(e.g., 1 for R and 1 for G in Bead Sample RG), then
both types of nondiagnostic evidence would produce di-
lution under an averaging integration method. In short,
as we show in more detail in the Appendix, an averaging
integration process can produce equivalent results (namely
dilution) for neutral and mixed nondiagnostic evidence
even when the implications of their individual components
are encoded quite differently from each other, leaving
open the possibility that they may not exert equivalent ef-
fects in some other judgment task. In the belief-revision
task, for example, even when the nondiagnostic evidence
is segregated, the judge may classify only zero-valued
evidence components as ignorable.
What happens when condition (2) above is not met—
that is, when (as in the case of mixed evidence) the non-
diagnostic portion of the evidence is not classified as
safe to ignore even though it has been segregated from
the diagnostic portion of the evidence? In the belief-
revision task, the nondiagnostic portion of the evidence
is segregated via elicitation of an initial judgment based
exclusively on the diagnostic portion of the evidence. We
have suggested that the initial judgment may establish a
working hypothesis that influences how subsequently
encountered evidence is interpreted (assuming that the
new evidence is not deemed to be ignorable). Thus mixed
evidence that is seen as being neutral in its implications
when evaluated in isolation, and that exerts a diluting in-
fluence when integrated with diagnostic evidence in an
aggregate judgment procedure, may be seen as having
quite different implications when evaluated in light of an
established working hypothesis in the belief-revision
procedure. Under these conditions, the judge may be
subject to a confirmatory bias (e.g., Nickerson, 1998; cf.
Russo et al., 1998) in which the evidence is evaluated in a
biased manner that favors an established working hypoth-
esis. Thus the mixed RG bead sample might be viewed as
favoring the predominantly red jar if previously encoun-
tered evidence has already implicated that jar.
We show in the Appendix that this result is not easily
captured using a standard information integration model
(Hogarth & Einhorn’s influential 1992 belief-adjustment
model) of either the averaging or additive variety. One
possible modification of such models, consistent with
our interpretation of the observed confirmation effect, is
to allow the subjective evaluation of the implications of
a piece of evidence to depend on what evidence has al-
ready been encountered. Further research into the deter-
minants and boundary conditions of the dilution effect
can help to shed additional light onto the processes un-
derlying evidence-based judgment.
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APPENDIX
Here we attempt to account for the following observations or “stylized facts” from the experiments reported
in this paper, using Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief-adjustment model. See Table 1 for a description of
the beads and jars task used in the experiments; note that R  red, G  green, and B  blue bead.
1. RR produces judgments favoring the predominantly red jar. (GG likewise produces judgments favoring
the predominantly green jar, but we can focus without loss of generality on RR as the diagnostic bead sample.)
2. Both BB and RG produce 50% judgments for either jar when presented in isolation.
3. Both RRBB and RRRG, in the aggregate procedure, produce less extreme judgments than those based
on RR alone (dilution effect).
4. A more pronounced dilution effect is produced in the aggregate procedure when RR has higher diag-
nosticity (in the CD case vs. the AB case).
5. The RRBB sample produces a more pronounced dilution effect than does the RRRG sample in the ag-
gregate procedure.
6. In the belief-revision procedure, RR then BB produces judgments that are no more or less extreme than
those based on RR alone (no dilution or confirmation effect).
7. In the belief-revision procedure, RR then RG produces more extreme judgments than those based on RR
alone (confirmation effect).
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) Belief-Adjustment Model, General Form
The model specifies how strength of belief in a hypothesis is updated after one encounters new evidence,
as follows:
Sk  Sk1  wk [s(xk )  R],
where Sk  degree of belief in hypothesis after evaluating k pieces of evidence (0  Sk  1); S0  initial degree
of belief; s(xk )  subjective evaluation of kth piece of evidence; and R  reference point against which impact
of kth piece of evidence is evaluated. The adjustment weight wk for k th piece of evidence (0  wk  1) is de-
fined as follows:
wk  αSk1 when s(xk)  R,
with α (0  α  1) representing sensitivity to “negative” evidence;
wk  β (1  Sk1) when s(xk)  R,
with β (0  β  1) representing sensitivity to “positive” evidence.
Evidence may be evaluated in either a “step-by-step” (SbS) manner, with belief adjusted sequentially follow-
ing separate subjective evaluation of each new piece of evidence, or in an “end-of-sequence” (EoS) manner,
with belief adjusted following subjective evaluation of an entire sequence of evidence taken as a whole.
The general form of the belief-adjustment model has two alternative implementations, depending on the
nature of the judgment task and the type of evidence under evaluation:
Estimation (averaging): R  Sk1; 0  s(xk)  1.
Evaluation (additive): R  0; 1  s(xk)  1.
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) suggested that the evaluation form is used when one is expressing belief on a di-
chotomous (“true–false”) scale using bipolar evidence encoded in terms of whether it is for or against the hy-
pothesis, and that the estimation form is used when one is expressing belief on a continuous (“how much”)
scale using unipolar evidence. This description would seem to imply that the probability judgment task used
in the present experiments is best implemented using the estimation form of the model. We implement that
form here, but have found the same general conclusion follows when the evaluation form is implemented in-
stead.
Note that the model takes the subjective evaluation of a piece of evidence, s(xk ), as input. To implement the
model, then, we need to specify how this variable is determined from the composition of the jars in our task.
We begin by imposing some constraints on this variable and then establish that the qualitative pattern of re-
sults produced by the model does not depend on the specific values of s(xk ) as long as they obey these con-
straints.
Initial Assumptions
We use the subscripts R and G on the strength of belief and subjective evaluation functions S and s to refer
to belief in the hypothesis that the beads were drawn from the predominantly red jar and the predominantly
green jar, respectively. We make a number of initial assumptions to implement the belief-adjustment model
and later explore whether relaxing one or more of these assumptions is necessary for the model to reproduce
the effects in question.
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Our initial assumptions are as follows:
1. SR0  SG0  0.5; prior to encountering any bead samples, the two hypotheses (jars) are seen as equally
likely.
2. The value of s for a bead pair (or a four-bead sequence in the aggregate task) is given by the (equal-
weighted) average value of s for its component beads.
3. sR(RR)  sR(RG)  sR(GG) and sR(RR)  sR(BB)  sR(GG), and vice versa for sG.
4. Four-bead sequences receive EoS processing in the aggregate judgment task, and SbS processing (i.e.,
of sequential bead pairs) in the belief-revision task.
5. Judged probability reflects the (normalized) balance of belief strength for the competing hypotheses; that
is, p(predominantly red jar)  SR / (SR  SG).
Assumption 1 is consistent with the observation that nondiagnostic bead pairs, when evaluated in isolation,
led to equal probability judgments for the two jars. Assumption 2 implies that each bead contributes inde-
pendently to the subjective evaluation of the sequence; the equal-weighting assumption reflects the fact that
the order of the individual beads within a pair was counterbalanced and the results collapsed over this vari-
able. Assumption 3 is consistent with the general ordering of judged probabilities for each target jar being ob-
served to follow the jar’s composition in terms of R, G, and B beads. Given that the aggregate and belief-
revision procedures produce different results, some sort of processing difference between them must be
captured in the model implementation, and Assumption 4 seems like the most obvious way to do this. As-
sumption 5 is probably too strong, since it is only one of any number of possible mappings from belief strength
to judged probability, but is convenient; the qualitative pattern of judgments produced by the model depends
only on the use of a mapping that increases monotonically with strength of belief in the focal hypothesis and
decreases monotonically with strength of belief in the alternative hypothesis, with equal weighting.
Belief-Adjustment Model: Estimation Form
In the estimation (or averaging) form of the belief-adjustment model, subjective evaluations of evidence
strength vary from 0 to 1. Given Assumption 1 above, it is necessary to set sR(B)  sG(B) and sR(R)  sR(G) 
sG(R)  sG(G) to ensure that probabilities of .5 are assigned to both jars when either nondiagnostic bead pair
(RG or BB) is evaluated on its own. We begin, more specifically, by setting sR(R)  sG(G)  0.7, sR(G) 
sG(R)  0.3, and sR(B)  sG(B)  0.5 (the midpoint of the s scale in the estimation form of the model). We
then compute the values of s for the bead pairs and the four-bead sequences in the aggregate task as the equal-
weighted average value of s of the component beads.
Having determined the values of s for the bead samples serving as evidence in the task, we then implement
the belief-adjustment model starting with the initial assumptions above, and setting α  β  1. Under these
conditions, the estimation form of the model produces a dilution effect of equal magnitude for both types of
nondiagnostic evidence, which is more pronounced for the belief-revision task than it is for the aggregate
task. Furthermore, the magnitude of the dilution effect increases with the difference between sR(R) and sR(G),
consistent with Effect 4 above. This implementation of the model, then, manages to reproduce the first four
effects listed above, but fails to capture the observed effects of judgment task (belief revision vs. aggregate)
and type of nondiagnostic evidence (mixed RG vs. neutral BB).
We can adjust the initial values of s associated with each bead in an attempt to reproduce the observation
that the dilution effect is more pronounced in the aggregate judgment task for neutral evidence (BB) than for
mixed evidence (RG). Specifically, increasing sR(B)  sG(B) to a value greater than .5 yields a more pro-
nounced dilution effect (for both the aggregate and belief revision tasks) for BB than for RG. Under this as-
sumption, the model is able to reproduce the first five observed effects listed above.
The principal difficulty encountered in this model implementation, however, is with regard to the belief-
revision task. As noted above, this version of the model produces a consistent dilution effect for the belief-
revision task, contrary to our findings. In fact, the model produces a dilution effect that is consistently larger
than that produced for the aggregate task, when in fact we found a dilution effect in the aggregate task but not
in the belief-revision task. One way to reduce the magnitude of the dilution effect produced by the model for
the belief-revision task is to decrease β (sensitivity to negative evidence); as β approaches zero, so does the
magnitude of the dilution effect produced for the belief-revision task. The magnitude of the dilution effect pro-
duced by the model in the aggregate task also decreases, but not as quickly and not all the way to zero. By set-
ting β to a near-zero value, then, the model can reproduce the first six of the seven observed effects listed
above. This version of the model, however, is unable to reproduce the observation that judgments in the belief-
revision task became more extreme following the introduction of mixed (RG) evidence, which we have called
a confirmation effect. In fact, there is no way for the model to reproduce this effect without relaxing one or
more of our initial assumptions. Under these assumptions, we were also unable to produce a confirmation ef-
fect using the evaluation form of the belief-adjustment model.
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Conclusion
Neither form of the belief-adjustment model could reproduce the full set of observed effects given our initial
assumptions. The confirmation effect observed for mixed evidence in the belief-revision task, in particular,
proved difficult for the model to produce without also producing other effects that were inconsistent with the
observed results (e.g., that both RG and BB were judged to be nondiagnostic when evaluated on their own).
How might our initial assumptions be relaxed so that the model could be able to reproduce the full pattern
of observed effects? Assumption 2 would seem to be the most obvious candidate. It associates a unique value
of s with each constituent bead in the context of particular jar, and in this sense assumes that the contribution
of a particular bead to the value of s for a bead pair is independent of all other evidence (i.e., beads) that has
been encountered. A natural modification, consistent with our interpretation of the observed confirmation ef-
fect, is to allow the subjective evaluation of a piece of evidence to depend on what evidence has already been
encountered. For example, after encountering RR, which strongly implicates the predominantly red jar, sub-
sequent assessment of RG would treat both R and G as more supportive of the predominantly red jar (and less
supportive of the predominantly green jar) than after encountering GG.
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